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AMONGST ALL THE common law jurisdictions, the United States
has probably the most insular constitutional system. The United States
Supreme Court has generally been resistant to surveying foreign case
law when adjudicating domestic disputes.' The general position of the
Court on comparative constitutionalism is succinctly captured in Jus-
tice Scalia's majority opinion in Printz v. United States.2 "[C] omparative
analysis [is] inappropriate to the task of interpreting a constitution
.... '-3 As observed by Paul Kahn, "While others are pursuing a trans-
national constitutional discourse, Americans are determined to locate
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of the University of San Francisco Law Review for their kind suggestions. Needless to say,
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1. Admittedly, there are some early signs that the Court might be more receptive to
the examination of foreign materials in the future, as exemplified in Roper v. Simmons, 125
S. Ct. 1183 (2005), Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), and Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.
304 (2002). In Atkins, the Court held that the execution of mentally retarded criminals is a
cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. Atkins, 536 U.S. at
311-12. Interestingly, the majority made a footnote reference to an amicus curiae brief
filed on behalf of the European Union, citing the overwhelming disapproval of the world
community towards the execution of the mentally retarded. Id. at 316. Similarly in Law-
rence, the Court concluded that a Texas statute criminalizing sodomy is in violation of a
person's constitutional right to privacy. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564-79. In support of its deci-
sion, the majority made reference to decisions from the European Court of Human Rights.
Id. at 576. In Roper, the Supreme Court invalidated state executions of persons who com-
mitted capital crimes when they were juveniles. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1198. To buttress its
position, the Court referred to a litany of international covenants and state practices
against the use ofjuvenile executions. Id. at 1199. Notwithstanding this, as discussed later
in this Article, it would seem thus that the United States judges are still coy about overt
engagement with comparative constitutionalism.
2. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
3. Id. at 921 n.1l.
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their constitutional discourse within their own unique text and their
own historical narrative.14
This Article puts forward two main claims. First, judicial engage-
ment with foreign case law is legitimate within America's constitu-
tional framework as comparative constitutionalism was within the
contemplation of the Framers, and such a transnational dialogue is
also consonant with the historical practices of the United States Su-
preme Court.
In defending this claim, this Article addresses two formal objec-
tions against the judicial use of comparative materials: (1) judicial ac-
ceptance of foreign case law effectively undermines the national
sovereignty of the United States by subjugating the domestic jurisdic-
tions unilaterally to foreign rules; and (2) the application of prevail-
ing current norms of foreign practices in resolving constitutional
disputes would not be within the original contemplation of the Fram-
ers at the time the Constitution was drafted and is tantamount to the
judicial usurpation of legislative power, thus undermining popular
sovereignty.
Notwithstanding the Court's formal reservations about the incep-
tion of comparative materials on the ground of legitimacy, this Article
advances the argument that the resistance of American courts in en-
gaging with foreign materials actually stems from the judges' substan-
tive disagreement with the prevailing socio-political foreign norms.
Essentially, it is a political choice for the courts to foreclose these disa-
greeable views at their inception so as to avoid having to challenge
their validity on the merits; this judicial sleight of hand thus allows
courts to legitimize domestic practices that have been abandoned
abroad without having to confront the socio-political or normative jus-
tifications for the disparate difference between local conditions and
prevailing global developments.
Despite the judicial insularity that is prevalent in the United
States constitutional system, legal scholarship on comparative consti-
tutionalism is a burgeoning field within academic circles. Two recent
articles are particularly insightful in their discussions of the theoreti-
cal bases for using comparative materials in constitutional adjudica-
tion. In one, Professor Mark Tushnet identifies three uses for
comparative constitutionalism: functionalism, expressivism, and brico-
4. Paul W. Kahn, Comparative Constitutionalism in a New Key, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2677,
2678 (2003).
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lage. 5 In the other, Professor Sujit Choudhry argues that comparative
materials may be applied in three interpretive modes, i.e. genealogi-
cal, dialogical, and universalist. 6 The second thesis claim of this Article
incorporates and further builds on the analytical models laid out by
Professors Mark Tushnet and Sujit Choudhry. Essentially, I argue that
there are in effect five normative uses of foreign case law that would
make comparative constitutionalism a worthwhile endeavor. Specifi-
cally, comparative materials have diagnostic, expository, affirmative,
functional, 7 and universalist8 value.
First, foreign constitutional cases have diagnostic value. Local
courts can use foreign precedents to identify the current constitu-
tional issue posed. These comparative sources aid the court in illus-
trating the existence of a particular problem and help frame relevant
issues for consideration. Second, comparative jurisprudence can be
put to expository use. This use, while encompassing the expressivist
approach advocated by Tushnet,9 goes further as the domestic court,
in using comparative reasoning, can also come to the realization that
its own constitutional culture warrants a rejection of the foreign
sources. Third, courts can use comparative sources in an affirmative
way where the foreign materials do not assist the courts in the adjudi-
catory process, but instead, only buttress the strength of a court's deci-
sion after it has been reached using domestic sources. Fourth,
national courts can use foreign constitutional materials functionally. 10
Under this mode, comparative jurisprudence is used as a learning aid.
5. See Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J.
1225 (1999).
6. See Sujit Choudhry, Globalization in Search ofJustification: Toward a Theory of Compar-
ative Constitutional Interpretation, 74 IND. L.J. 819, 833 (1999).
7. Tushnet, supra note 5, at 1228. Mark Tushnet, in his article, argues that a func-
tional use of comparative constitutionalism allows a state to "use a mechanism developed
elsewhere to perform a specific function, to improve the way in which that function is
performed" in the receiving state. Id.
8. Choudry, supra note 6, at 841-55. Sujit Choudhry argues that the universalist
mode of interpretation holds that constitutional guarantee are cut from a universal cloth,
and, hence, that all constitutional courts are engaged in the identification and interpreta-
tion of the same set of norms. Id.
9. Tushnet, supra note 5, at 1236. The expressivist approach to comparative constitu-
tional law states that comparative inquiry may help us see our own practices in a new light
and might lead courts using comparative methods to results they would not have reached
had they not consulted the comparative material. Id.
10. Id. at 1238. The functional use of comparative sources is similar to the dialogical
mode of interpretation advocated by Professor Choudhry. Choudhry argues that courts
identify the normative and factual assumptions underlying their own constitutional juris-
prudence by engaging with comparative jurisprudence of other jurisdictions; through a
process of interpretive self reflection, they may thus conclude that foreign and domestic
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National courts can learn from the constitutional experiences of for-
eign jurisdictions and avoid potential pitfalls or find better solutions
to the status quo. Finally, a universalist use of comparative sources al-
lows national courts to engage with foreign jurisprudence, and in the
process, discover universal or transcendent principles that should be
incorporated locally.
Additionally, this Article argues why Professor Tushnet's brico-
lage process and Professor Choudhry's genealogical mode of interpre-
tation are invalid normative bases for using comparative sources.
Professor Tushnet understands bricolage as a judicial process
whereby courts adjudicate by making a "random or playful selection
from [comparative] materials at hand."'" While he has indeed con-
vinced this author that judges often problem-solve by co-opting ex-
isting materials at hand, this "unconscious, natural"'12 use of
comparative sources has only been justified as a matter of the practice,
rather than on any positive normative basis. 13 Essentially, the brico-
lage process lacks a theoretical, normative basis forjustifying compara-
tive constitutionalism. On the other hand, Professor Choudhry argues
that since some "constitutions are often tied together by complicated
relationships of genealogy and history,"'14 prima facie relevance of
each other's case law is established without the need for "an interpret-
ing court to come to a nuanced understanding of the rationales un-
derlying comparative jurisprudence." 15 This Article argues against this
use of comparative materials as it presupposes that the constitutional
future to be chartered by each state would necessarily be the same,
when a country shares a historical nexus with another. The main dan-
ger with the genealogical mode of interpretation is that it permits
courts to dispense with scrutinizing the intrinsic value and relevance
of foreign case law and blindly accepting its legitimacy simply on the
ground that there had been a common shared past between the con-
stitutional systems.
This Article is divided into four parts. Part I begins with an evalua-
tion of two formalistic objections often raised against the judicial re-
ception of comparative materials. These objections are that the
embrace of prevailing foreign case law undermines national sover-
assumptions are sufficiently similar to warrant the use of comparative law. Choudry, supra
note 6, at 825.
11. Id. at 1237.
12. Id. at 1238.
13. Id. at 1286.
14. Choudry, supra note 6, at 838.
15. Id. at 871.
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eignty and is simultaneously undemocratic as these norms are incom-
patible with the Framers' original understanding of the Constitution.
This part also surveys the historical practices of the United States Su-
preme Court and examines the level ofjudicial receptivity to compara-
tive constitutionalism in the country's early years. Part II continues
with a scrutiny of the substantive political realities behind the judicial
pronouncements that drive the Court's insular rhetoric. Part III pro-
vides a brief survey of five normative uses for comparative sources as
elaborated above and also argues against the use of the "bricolage"
process and the genealogical mode of interpretation as advocated by
Professor Tushnet and Professor Choudhry. Part IV forms the bulk of
this paper whereby I examine how various common law courts around
the world have enriched their domestic adjudicatory process by using
the foreign materials in the five abovementioned ways, i.e. diagnosis,
exposition, affirmation, functionalism, and universalism.
I. Formalistic Concerns with Comparative Reasoning
Legal particularists have used "sovereignty" as a shield to fend off
the critiques of comparativists who argue for a more extensive judicial
use of comparative materials during constitutional adjudication. 16
This part of the Article takes issue with the sovereignty concerns
raised by legal isolationists. As a prelude, I would like to point out that
there has been an unfortunate conflation of two separate notions of
sovereignty. The first aspect relates to national sovereignty, and the
second implicates popular sovereignty. The first warns of the potential
violation of a nation's right to self determination that comparative
constitutionalism brings. By introducing foreign rules and practices
into the home jurisdictions, judges effectively undermine the national
sovereignty of their home nations by cuffing them to international
norms. The second, but related, objection raises the specter ofjudicial
supremacy as a caution against comparative constitutionalism, i.e. the
judicial application of prevailing foreign norms that are inconsistent
with the Framers' original understanding of the Constitution is tanta-
mount to judicial usurpation of popular sovereignty.
In discussing the abiding importance of sovereignty, Ernest
Young argues:
When law binding on American actors is made or enforced outside
of these [specified constitutional] processes, the problem is not
16. See, e.g., Roger Alford, Misusing International Sources to Interpret the Constitution, 98
AM. J. INT'L L. 57 (2004); Ernest Young, The Trouble with Global Constitutionalism, 38 TEx.
INT'L L.J. 527 (2003).
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simply one of affront to the "grandeur" or "dignity" of the State.
Rather the concern is that the circumvention of ordinary domestic
processes renders those processes ineffective in their role of safe-
guarding liberty. 17
Professor Young refers to concerns of national sovereignty in his first
sentence, while in the second, he warns against counter-majoritarian
dangers of judicial review, i.e. popular sovereignty. Similarly, Roger
Alford maintains that the use of "global opinions as a means of consti-
tutional interpretation dramatically undermines sovereignty by utiliz-
ing one vehicle-constitutional supremacy-that can trump the
democratic will reflected in state and federal legislative and executive
pronouncements." 18 Here, Professor Alford speaks of the erosion of
popular sovereignty as opposed to national sovereignty. It might be
more useful to draw a terminological distinction between both aspects
of sovereignty as they implicate different concerns that can be met by
separate arguments.
To defend legal particularism, an isolationist can perhaps find no
better spokesperson than Justice Scalia of the United States Supreme
Court. In his scathing dissent against the Court's decision to invalidate
the imposition of the death penalty on juvenile offenders under six-
teen years of age, he admonished:
We must never forget that it is a Constitution of the United States
of America that we are expounding .... [W] here there is not first
a settled consensus among our own people, the views of other na-
tions, however enlightened the Justices of this Court may think
them to be, cannot be imposed upon Americans through the
Constitution.19
In the same vein, Justice Scalia was incensed when the Court con-
cluded that a Texas statute criminalizing sodomy is in violation of a
person's constitutional right to privacy.20 What irked him most was
perhaps the majority's reference to European precedents and prac-
tices in support of their decision to invalidate that statute:
Constitutional entitlements do not spring into existence . . . be-
cause foreign nations decriminalize conduct .... The Court's dis-
cussion of these foreign views . . . is therefore meaningless dicta.
Dangerous dicta, however, since "this Court... should not impose
foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans."2 1
17. Young, supra note 16, at 542-43.
18. Alford, supra note 16, at 58.
19. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 868-69 n.4 (1988).
20. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
21. Id. at 598 (emphasis in original) (quoting Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990 (2002)).
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Chief Justice Rehnquist has been equally scornful about the use
of foreign case law in constitutional adjudication. In his dissent in At-
kins v. Virginia,22 he wrote:
I write.separately, however, to call attention to the defects in the
Court's decision to place weight on foreign laws ... and opinion
polls in reaching its conclusion. The Court's suggestion that these
sources are relevant to the constitutional question finds little sup-
port in our precedents and, in my view, is antithetical to considera-
tions of federalism, which instruct that any "permanent prohibition
upon all units of democratic government must [be apparent] in
the operative acts (laws and the application of laws) that the peo-
ple have approved." 23
Therefore, Rehnquist contended that "the viewpoints of other coun-
tries simply are not relevant" 24 in establishing a national consensus
against the execution of mentally retarded criminals in the United
States.
In the previous dissents, Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehn-
quist appear to argue that the judicial use of comparative materials
implicates national and popular sovereignty concerns. Both formal
objections will be examined in turn.
A. National Sovereignty Concerns
First, Justice Scalia essentially perceives the application of foreign
precedents as an act of surrender of national sovereignty to foreign
decision makers who are not accountable and responsible to the
American public. The judicial homogenization of substantive laws
would be a mode of cultural imperialism whereby the receiving juris-
dictions would be compelled to accept the supremacy and efficacy of
the foreign norms.
Scalia's appeal to American exceptionalism obscures the fact that
many non-comparativists would accept that legislatures can legiti-
mately establish treaties to homogenize their substantive laws. 25 After
all, many countries decide that it is in their countries' best interest to
accede to agreements that impose duties and obligations on them vis-
A-vis the international community. This partial cession of domestic
control results from an internal cost-benefit calculus and an exercise
of domestic will. Indeed, Scalia's apparent displeasure stems from the
22. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
23. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 322 (2002) (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting) (altera-
tion in original) (citations omitted).
24. Id. at 325.
25. See Alford supra note 16.
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judicial homogenization of substantive law in the absence of legislative
mandate. There may be some merit to the argument that the judiciary
should not be the branch of government to import foreign norms into
the domestic framework.26 However, the rhetorical appeal of how na-
tional sovereignty has been undermined through this internalizing
process obfuscates the fact that essentially it is a domestic adjudicator
who decides that a foreign rule is applicable. Herein, foreign law only
becomes domestically binding when local judges deem it to be; any
objections to that should not be met by raising the national flag. The
principle of self-determination is not violated if a nation, through one
of its branches, executive, legislative, or judicial, makes an autono-
mous decision to align its laws with other nations. This choice, exer-
cised independently of other nations, constitutes an exercise of, and
not a violation of, a state's right to self-determination.
B. Popular Sovereignty Concerns
The second objection to the judicial import of foreign value
points to counter-majoritarian dangers of judicial review. According
to this viewpoint, when courts constitutionalize prevailing foreign
norms that are not within the original understandings of the constitu-
tional Framers, they circumvent the popular mandate granted to the
democratically-elected legislatures to make law. This is essentially the
thrust of Alford's grievance with comparative constitutionalism:
If international majoritarian values cannot find expression through
the political branches, advocates resort to the courts. But in the
courts, overcoming sovereign values reflected in legislative enact-
ments can be achieved only through constitutional supremacy.
Hence the strategy to utilize international law to interpret the Con-
stitution. If what is good and just cannot be achieved by democratic
governance, then it shall be foisted upon the governed through
constitutional interpretation. 27
This objection is founded on two assumptions. First, the Framers did
not intend prevailing global opinion to have any weight within the
domestic interpretive framework. Second, the Framers only intended
the Constitution to address specific concerns they had in mind, thus
foreclosing any contemporary adaptation to modern developments.
In essence, this objection is not advanced against the use of compara-
tive reasoning per se but questions instead the role of the judiciary vis-
a-vis constitutional interpretation.
26. This raises the popular sovereignty concern addressed infra Part I.B.
27. Alford, supra note 16, at 59.
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The first assumption can be easily dispelled when one examines
the historical documents and practices at the time of the country's
founding and the early years pursuant to it. The signatories to the
1776 Declaration of Independence expressed their belief in paying "a
decent respect to the opinions of mankind .... "28 Amongst the signa-
tories, Thomas Jefferson was particularly inspired by the political ide-
als shared by Scottish Enlightenment thinkers such as Francis
Hutcheson who had exalted a republican notion of honor.29 Essen-
tially, honor was a vanguard of virtue; it held men's opinion in the
highest esteem and held an individual's actions accountable to the
rest of mankind. Eminent legal historian Garry Wills has thus argued
that pursuant to this republican code of conduct, honor held "men's
opinion in high esteem, and felt shame to be caught in less than virtu-
ous action before mankind."3 0 Thus to uphold honor and virtue, the
exhortation to pay a decent respect to the opinions of mankind trans-
lates into a requisite to explain oneself to others and a mandate to
take into account their responses and reactions in America's domestic
decision making process.
In the Federalist Papers No. 63,31 Madison also exhorted the
American people to pay "attention to the judgment of other nations"
and "the opinion of the impartial world" so that the United States
would in turn make decisions that were the "offspring of a wise and
honorable policy."13 2 Madison and Hamilton also spoke of the lessons
of "[e]xperience [being] the oracle of truth; and where its responses
are unequivocal, they ought to be conclusive and sacred. ' 33 Compara-
tive constitutional insights undoubtedly had a pervasive and profound
influence on the United States Founding Fathers, 34 and it is inconceiv-
able that they would prevent future generations from engaging in the
28. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776). In his dissent in Knight v.
Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 997 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (denying certiorari),Justice Breyer
stated that "[wiillingness to consider foreign judicial views in comparable cases is not sur-
prising in a Nation that from its birth has given a 'decent respect to the opinions of man-
kind."' Id.
29. GARY WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA: JEFF RSON'S DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, 317
(1979).
30. Id.
31. THE FEDERALIST No. 63 (James Madison).
32. Id.
33. THE FEDERALIST No. 20 (Alexander Hamilton & James Madison). Hamilton and
Madison in Federalist No. 20 were referring to the experiences of federations like Ger-
many, Poland, and the United Netherlands, which would serve as models for America to
learn from. Id.
34. See David Fontana, Refined Comparativism in Constitutional Law, 49 UCLA L. REv.
539 (2001).
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same process of comparative reasoning that led to the adoption of the
United States Constitution.
Justice Scalia nevertheless makes a valiant, but weak, attempt to
discount the probative value of these documents so far as they en-
dorse comparative constitutionalism. In Printz, he wrote, "comparative
analysis is inappropriate to the task of interpreting a Constitution,
though it was of course quite relevant to the task of writing one."3 5
Essentially, Scalia seeks to distinguish between the use of comparative
materials in creating a Constitution and its use in interpreting one.
This dichotomy is certainly quite perplexing especially because there
is no shred of evidence that the Framers subscribed to drawing such a
distinction. Neither has Justice Scalia offered a reason for coming to
such a conclusion.3 6 Furthermore, given that the Framers had
adopted comparative analysis in the design of the United States Con-
stitution, surely it is not implausible that they had envisioned the judi-
cial branch, a component of their institutional design, to undertake
the same mode of comparative analysis in the discharge of their con-
stitutional duty. Moreover, as pointed out by Epstein and Knight, if we
perceive constitutional borrowing, whether performed by judicial or
legislative actors, as the institutional design of a society, we need not
differentiate between the two modes as any theory of institutional de-
sign ought to be able to accommodate both. 37
Turning to the early historical practices of the United States Su-
preme Court, we can observe how receptive the judges were toward
comparative reasoning. America's first Chief Justice, John Jay, held
that "by taking a place among the nations of the earth, [the United
States had] become amenable to the laws of [other] nations." 38 In
Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon,39 the Supreme Court followed the "us-
ages and received obligations of the civilized world"40 and ruled that a
foreign sovereign vessel in an American port was not subject to the
jurisdiction of United States courts.41 Similarly, the Court held in
Thirty Hogheads of Sugar v. Boyle42 that "[t] he decisions of the Courts of
35. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 n.ll (1997).
36. Id.
37. In essence, Knight and Epstein advance the theory that it is the political prefer-
ences of the judges that motivate courts to select one institutional design of a constitu-
tional system over the other. See Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, Constitutional Borrowing and
Nonborrowing, 1 INT'LJ. CONST. L. 196, 204, 209 (2003).
38. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 474 (1793).
39. 11 U.S. 116 (1812).
40. Id. at 137.
41. Id. at 145-46.
42. 13 U.S. 191 (1815).
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every country, so far as they were founded upon a law common to
every country, will be received, not as authority but with respect.
43
Even in the infamous Dred Scott v. Sandford44 decision, both the major-
ity and the dissent cited European practices to justify their respective
decisions. 45 It would thus seem that the review and survey of foreign
and transnational legal sources is consistent with the United States'
earliest and oldest constitutional traditions. Admittedly, there is a dis-
tinction between the Supreme Court determining what customary in-
ternational law exists that binds the domestic polity and what foreign
rule exists that may be applicable to the local constitutional system.
Nonetheless, in both instances the historical practice of looking be-
yond the borders to identify the state of law in the United States un-
derscores the receptivity of the early courts to rules that are
formulated outside the domestic system. This early judicial receptivity
to foreign decisions and the "law of nations" in constitutional adjudi-
cation indicate that America's authoritative canon may have been
more inclusive in the past and is amenable to judicial change over
time.46
Yet a group of constitutional theorists known as the originalists
remains unconvinced of the legitimacy in considering contemporary
foreign norms during constitutional adjudication. Justice Scalia, in in-
terpreting the Constitution, would "look for a sort of objectified in-
tent-the intent that a reasonable person would gather from the text
of the law, placed alongside the remainder of the corpus juris. '47 In
deriving this objective intent, Scalia would look to historical under-
standings and practices that were accepted at the time the constitu-
tional provisions were adopted. Thus, contemporary practices,
especially foreign ones, would be irrelevant during constitutional
adjudication.
Originalists often caution that ifjudges were allowed to stray from
the original understanding of the Constitution, they would be given a
free rein to amend the Constitution and violate the separation of pow-
ers principle sacredly enshrined within the constitutional text. Chief
Justice Rehnquist warns that in such an eventuality, 'Judges then are
43. Id. at 198.
44. 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
45. Id. at 408, 468.
46. VickiJackson, Transnational Discourse, Relational Authority, and the U.S. Court: Gender
Equality, 37 Lov. L.A. L. REV. 271, 342 (2003).
47. ANTONIN SCALIA, Common Law Courts in a Civil Law System: The Role of the United
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION
17 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1998).
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no longer the keepers of the covenant; instead they are a small group
of fortunately situated people with a roving commission to second-
guess Congress, state legislatures and federal administrative officers
concerning what is best for the country."48 In the process, judges, who
are non-elected officials, would be imposing norms that the people
have not accepted through their democratically elected representa-
tives. 49
Yet originalists appreciate that the abolition of an independent
judiciary would subject the individual to the whims of pure majoritari-
anism. In essence, originalists argue that their theory offers the only
viable solution by which the Court can restrain itself from encroach-
ing into the legislative domain and yet act as the bulwark against the
evils of majoritarian excesses. 50 As pointed out by Vicki Jackson, this
tension between democracy and self-rule on one hand and the judicial
enforcement of rights on the other, is "magnified when the basis for
judicial determinations is a source of law beyond the control of the
judges' own polity."5 1 Essentially, it would appear that United States'
resistance to transnational and comparative law rests on a vibrant idea
of popular sovereignty as the source of the rule of law. 52 Originalists
claim that judges should enforce only the original meaning of the
Framers as that was the meaning duly ratified by the people in a refer-
endum; the espousal of any other modes of constitutional interpreta-
tion would be to condone illegitimate constitutional change through
judicial interpretation.
The second assumption made by originalists is that the Framers
intended to codify their specific original practices within the constitu-
tional framework and bar judges from having recourse to contempo-
rary moral norms, foreign or domestic, during adjudication.53
However, this assumption is not supported by any historical evidence.
In fact, where the Framers wanted to exclude a certain mode of consti-
tutional interpretation they were explicit in spelling it out. This took
the form of the Ninth Amendment, which states that " [t] he enumera-
48. William Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEx. L. REv. 693, 698
(1976).
49. Antonin Scalia, Commentary, 40 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1119 (1996).
50. Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1,
2-3. (1971).
51. Jackson, supra note 46, at 328.
52. Paul Kahn, supra note 4, at 2702.
53. SCAUA, supra note 47, at 140-41.
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tion in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to
deny or disparage others retained by the people.154
Moreover, even if a common practice was accepted at the time
the constitutional provisions were adopted, this does not establish the
fact the Framers intended to constitutionalize that convention for sub-
sequent generations to obey. It is equally possible that the Framers
had given little thought to that issue or preferred to allow future gen-
erations to decide the issue for themselves. This interpretation is also
more consistent with a textual reading of the constitutional provi-
sions. The Framers have used both specific and broad provisions
within the constitutional text, thus indicating that separate clauses
should be interpreted at different levels of generality.55 Consider for
instance the Equal Protection Clause enshrined in the Fourteenth
Amendment. 56 The Framers chose to use open-textured and relativis-
tic terms instead of expressly confining the scope of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause to specific bases of discrimination such as race or specific
instances of discriminatory practices. 57 Where the Framers wanted the
constitutional clauses to be read strictly, they used highly specific and
particular words. For example, elections for the House of Representa-
tives have to be held every two years and not "periodically" or "regu-
larly." s58  Given that the Framers had intentionally left the
constitutional provisions enshrining "due process" and "equal protec-
tion" ambiguously worded, fully comprehending that the language
was not specific and could be interpreted in various ways, the choice
to adopt a broader principle must be thus respected. After all, if a
prohibition's reach was restricted to the practices that were thought to
fall afoul of the Constitution at the time the provisions were adopted,
it would leave no room for reasoned adjudication of practices that
technological advancements bring.59 Thus, broadly phrased constitu-
tional clauses like "equal protection" or "freedom of speech" have to
embody abstract principles rather than just encapsulate mere histori-
cal practices.
Originalists, nonetheless, have found ways to reconcile the view
that constitutional provisions stand for abstract principles with their
theory, by maintaining that these constitutional principles must be in-
54. U.S. CONST. amend IX.
55. See id.
56. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § (1).
57. Id.
58. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
59. Mark D. Greenberg & Harry Litman, The Meaning of Original Meaning, 86 GEO. L.J.
569, 580 (1998).
Summer 2005] TRANSNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONALISM
terpreted such that original practices would always be upheld in a con-
stitutional challenge. Justice Scalia wrote: "Whatever abstract tests we
may choose to devise, they cannot supersede-and indeed ought to
be crafted so as to reflect-those constant and unbroken national tra-
ditions that embody the people's understanding of ambiguous consti-
tutional texts."60
Such a reading of the Constitution might be coherent if not for
the fact that most originalists often become ambitious and seek to
maintain the integrity of their constitutional theory whilst defending
the decision of Brown v. Board of Education.61 Robert Bork, for one,
argues that although the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did
not intend to ban segregation, the Court "cannot pick and choose
between competing gratifications and, likewise, cannot write the de-
tailed code the Framers omitted, requiring equality in this case but
not in another."62
Bork's attempt to reconcile an originalist understanding of the
Constitution with Brown seems rather disingenuous. Originalism is
premised on the understanding that specific practices accepted at the
time the constitutional provisions were adopted should not be held
unconstitutional by future courts; given the fact that the historical re-
cord indicates that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did
not intend to outlaw state-imposed segregation per se, 63 there is no
reason for Bork to select a higher level of generality to interpret the
Equal Protection clause in this instance. Bork essentially gerryman-
ders the levels of generality found within the abstract constitutional
principles and selects an arbitrary frame of reference to suit his politi-
cal philosophy.
Justice Scalia, on the other hand, glosses over Brown:
I argue for the role of tradition in giving content only to ambigu-
ous constitutional text .... In my view the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's requirement of "equal protection of the laws," combined
with the Thirteenth Amendment's abolition of the institution of
black slavery, leaves no room for doubt that laws treating people
differently because of their race are invalid.64
60. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 568 (1996) (ScaliaJ., dissenting) (empha-
sis omitted).
61. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
62. Bork, supra note 50.
63. See RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BYJUDIcIARY- THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOUR-
TEENTH AMENDMENT 117-34 (1977).
64. Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62, 95 n.1 (1990).
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Justice Scalia suggests here that judges need not observe an originalist
understanding of the Constitution when the constitutional text is un-
ambiguous and clear. This concession is most puzzling. If a term like
"equal protection of the law" is considered unambiguous, I would
dare say nothing in the United States Constitution can be deemed
vague.
Nevertheless, some credit must be given to Justice Scalia for con-
ceding that "originalism ... must somehow come to terms with real-
ity"65 and that no judge, however committed to originalism, would
sustain branding or public lashing today, even if those practices were
well accepted in 1791. This crucial concession points out that eventu-
ally, if we want to commit ourselves to the glorious generalities of the
Constitution, we have to read the Constitution in light of "evolving
standards of decency" and cannot blindly uphold all original practices
of yesteryears. Drawing principles from practices may in turn lead to
the possibility of rejecting these same practices. 6 6 A more nuanced
understanding of the Constitution is, in essence, whatJustice Brennan
was driving at when he stated:
Current Justices read the Constitution in the only way we can: as
twentieth century Americans. We look to the history of the time of
framing and to the intervening history of interpretation. But the
ultimate question must be: What do the words of the text mean in
our time? For the genius of the Constitution rests not in any static
meaning it might have had in a world that is dead and gone, but in
the adaptability of its great principles to cope with current
problems and current needs. 67
II. Substantive Concerns with Comparative Reasoning
Part I argues that the judicial use of comparative materials in the
United States is neither a surrender of national sovereignty nor a usur-
pation of popular sovereignty. Thus,judicial engagement with foreign
case law is legitimate within the American constitutional framework as
comparative constitutionalism was envisaged by the Framers. Further-
more, such 'jurisprudential cosmopolitanism" 68 is also consistent with
the historical practices of the United States Supreme Court.
65. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 849, 861 (1989).
66. Greenberg & Litman, supra note 59, at 617.
67. William Brennan, The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification, 27 S.
TEX. L. REV. 433, 438 (1986).
68. Sanford Levinson, Looking Abroad when Interpreting the U.S. Constitution: Some Reflec-
tions, 39 TEx IN'T'L LJ. 353, 356 (2004).
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Part II argues that the militant provincialism espoused by some
Justices on the Supreme Court stems not from the judicial concerns
over the illegitimacy of comparative constitutionalism, but from the
judges' substantive disagreement with the contemporary socio-politi-
cal overseas norms.69 Essentially, it is a political choice by the judiciary
to foreclose these disagreeable views at their inception so as to avoid
having to assess their validity on the merits; this judicial sleight of
hand thus permits the Court to uphold local practices that are unpop-
ular abroad without having to justify how these domestic conditions
are socially necessary or normatively superior to the prevailing global
developments. What unfortunately happens is that judges essentially
cite foreign materials when they are in accordance with their preexist-
ing views and erect a cultural barrier to ward off the overseas norms
they do not support.
The foregoing discussions have shown Justices Scalia and Rehn-
quist to be averse toward comparative constitutionalism, yet they have
not been consistently so. In McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n,7° the
majority of the Supreme Court held that an Ohio legislative provision
that prohibited the distribution of anonymous campaign literature
was in violation of the First Amendment. 71 In his dissent, Justice Scalia
interestingly referred to the legislative practices of England, Canada,
and Australia to buttress his argument that permitting anonymity of
campaign literature did not improve the quality of the electoral
campaign:
The Justices of the majority set their own views ... up against the
views of... state legislatures and the federal Congress. We might
also add to the list on the other side the legislatures of foreign
democracies: Australia, Canada, and England, for example, all
have prohibitions upon anonymous campaigning. 72
Scalia's receptivity to invoking comparative practices in other
Western democracies here stands in sharp contrast with the parochial
and insular rhetoric he espoused in Printz73 and Lawrence v. Texas.7 4
Similarly, Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice Scalia, held
that the Washington state ban on physician assisted suicide was consti-
tutional. 75 What is significant is that Rehnquist, albeit in a footnote,
69. See id.
70. 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
71. Id. at 358.
72. Id. at 381 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
73. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 n.l (1997).
74. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 598 (2003).
75. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
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referred to other legislatures, such as the British and New Zealand
legislatures, which were "embroiled in similar debates," and specifi-
cally pointed to the Supreme Court of Canada's rejection of "a claim
that the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms establishes a fun-
damental right to assisted suicide. '7 6 Earlier in his dissent in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey,77 Chief Justice Rehnquist had referred, albeit flatly
and in a footnote, to a German decision. 78 Two years after Roe v.
Wade,79 the West German constitutional court,80 by contrast, struck
down a law liberalizing access to abortion on the grounds that life
developing within the womb is constitutionally protected.8 1 While he
did not embellish this information with any commentary, his implica-
tion that Roe was not universally accepted by other national courts was
clear. In a more overt display, Chief Justice Rehnquist affirmed his
support for comparative constitutionalism in an extrajudicial address:
Now that constitutional law is solidly grounded in so many coun-
tries, it is time that the United States courts begin looking to the
decisions of other constitutional courts to aid their deliberative
process. The United States courts, and legal scholarship in our
country generally, have been laggard in relying on comparative law
and decisions of other countries. But I predict that with so many
thriving constitutional courts in the world today.., that approach
will be changed in the near future.8 2
In the foregoing instances, these same supposedly anti-compara-
tivists in Atkins v. Virginia83 and Lawrence8 4 had abandoned their
qualms about comparative constitutionalism and were rather un-
abashed about using the judicial and legislative practices of other na-
tions to criticize the approach taken by the Court. But is this any
wonder? Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist are conservative
jurists renowned for defending the rights of the states to carry out
76. Id. at 718 n.16.
77. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
78. Id. at 945 n.1 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
79. 410 U.S. 959 (1973).
80. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Consitutional Court] Feb. 25, 1975,
39 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 1 (F.R.G.), translated in Rob-
ert G.Jones &John D. Gorby, West German Abortion Decision: A Contrast to Roe v. Wade, 9J.
MARSHALLJ. PRAC. & PROC. 605 (1976).
81. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 945 n.1 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting).
82. WILLIAM REHNQUIST, Constitutional Courts-Comparative Remarks (1989), reprinted in
GERMANY AND ITS BASIC LAw: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE: A GERMAN-AMERICAN SYMPOSIUM
412 (Paul Kirchhof & Donald P. Kommers eds., 1993).
83. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
84. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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capital punishment,85 to limit the availability of abortion, 86 and to
criminalize sodomy. 87 Given their political preferences, it should
come as no surprise when they invoke comparative doctrines that but-
tress their legal position and dismiss those that argue against it.
An alternative explanation for the pattern of uses of foreign
sources by Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist would be that
these judges draw a normative distinction between the reliance on
non-domestic sources when upholding the reasonableness of a statute
(which they accept) and the use of foreign materials to invalidate lo-
cal legislations (which they reject). Pursuant to this reading, the
judges do not deem recourse to foreign materials as illegitimate per se
but merely object to their relevance when used to invalidate domestic
statutes, largely because foreign materials are not responsive to the
cultural peculiarities of the domestic system and cannot prove that the
local statute is necessarily unconstitutional. This interpretation may be
plausible if not for the fact that these judges had roundly rejected the
use of comparative constitutionalism per se and had in no way limited
their objections to the extent to which foreign materials are used. As
discussed earlier, Scalia had viewed foreign opinions as "meaningless
dicta,"88 while Rehnquist had admonished his more liberal brethren
for issuing decisions that "place weight on foreign laws."89
It is thus evident that these judicial actors essentially adjudicate
according to their normative beliefs about what should constitute the
ideal state of law.90 The selection and/or dismissal of foreign case law
merely reflects the judges' substantive disagreement with their legal
principles as opposed to their discomfort with the national or cultural
pedigree. One could only hope that these judges would be more
forthcoming about their substantive disagreements with the foreign
case law and engage these viewpoints on their merits, rather than just
brush them off by erecting a wall of cultural diffidence.
85. See Atkins v Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815
(1988).
86. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
87. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
88. Id. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
89. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 322 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
90. Epstein & Knight, supra note 37, at 208.
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HI. Critique on Bricolage and Genealogical Modes of
Comparative Reasoning
Notwithstanding the judicial parochialism that exists in the
United States constitutional system, legal scholarship advocating com-
parative constitutionalism is emerging as a burgeoning field within ac-
ademic circles. Two recent articles are particularly insightful in their
discussions of the theoretical bases for using comparative materials in
constitutional adjudication. In one, Professor Mark Tushnet identifies
three uses for comparative constitutionalism: functionalism, expressiv-
ism, and bricolage. 91 In the other, Professor Sujit Choudhry argues
that comparative materials may be applied in three interpretive
modes: genealogical, dialogical, and universalist.92
Functionalism claims that specific constitutional provisions are
created to serve particular functions in any constitutional model;
"[c] omparative constitutional study can help identify those functions
and show how different constitutional provisions serve the same func-
tion in different constitutional systems. ' 93 Expressivism is based on the
normative premise that comparative inquiry may help recast the prac-
tices of the domestic legal system in new light; this might thus lead
courts using comparative methods to legal results that they would not
have reached had they not engaged in comparative scrutiny.94 This is
similar to the dialogical use of foreign materials as advocated by
Choudhry whereby courts engage with comparative jurisprudence "in
order to better understand their own constitutional systems and juris-
prudence. ' 95 As for bricolage, it is a process whereby judges are asked
to randomly select legal materials from other jurisdictions and apply
them to the cases they are adjudicating at hand.96 Universalist inter-
pretation holds that all constitutional courts are engaged in the identi-
fication and interpretation of the same set constitutional norms such
that foreign judgments may provide a more expedient way for domes-
tic courts to analyze the same repository of transcendent legal princi-
ples.97 Finally, the genealogical mode of comparative reasoning
91. See Tushnet, supra note 5, at 1228.
92. See Choudhry, supra note 6, at 825.
93. Tushnet, supra note 5, at 1228.
94. Id. at 1236.
95. Choudhry, supra note 6, at 836.
96. Tushnet, supra note 5, at 1237.
97. Choudhry, supra note 6, at 835.
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justifies the import of foreign cases when constitutions are tied to-
gether by the same relationship of history and descent.98
Building on these analytical models laid out by Tushnet and
Choudhry, this Article argues that there are, in effect five normative
uses of foreign case law that would justify the import of comparative
materials into the domestic legal system. Specifically, comparative
materials have diagnostic, expository, affirmative, functional, and uni-
versalist value. Firstly, foreign constitutional cases have diagnostic
value. Domestic courts can use foreign precedents to identify the con-
stitutional issue posed. Comparative jurisprudence can assist the court
in illustrating the existence of a particular problem and help frame
the relevant legal issues under consideration. Second, comparative
sources can be put to expository use. This use, while encompassing
the expressivist approach advocated by Tushnet, goes further as the
domestic court, when engaging in comparative study, can also come
to the realization that its own constitutional culture necessitates a re-
nunciation of overseas sources. Third, national courts can use foreign
materials in an affirmative way where the foreign sources do not assist
the courts in the adjudicatory process but instead add weight to the
strength of courts' decisions after they have been reached using do-
mestic materials. Fourth, courts can use foreign constitutional materi-
als functionally. Under this mode, comparative jurisprudence is used
as a learning aid. National courts can pore over the constitutional ex-
periences of other jurisdictions and learn from them to avoid poten-
tial pitfalls or find improved solutions to the status quo. Finally, a
universalist use of foreign sources allows courts to engage with com-
parative jurisprudence and in the process allows courts to determine
transcendent principles that should be incorporated domestically.
Before exploring how common law courts around the world have
adjudicated using these various modes of comparative reasoning, I
would also endeavor to argue at the outset why Professor Tushnet's
bricolage process and Professor Choudhry's genealogical mode of in-
terpretation are invalid normative bases for using comparative
sources.
Professor Tushnet perceives bricolage as a judicial process
whereby courts adjudicate by making a "random or playful selection
from [comparative] materials at hand."99 While Tushnet has pointed
out that judges indeed often problem solve by co-opting existing
98. Id. at 825.
99. Tushnet, supra note 5, at 1237.
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materials at hand, this "unconscious, natural"100 use of comparative
reasoning has been only justified as a matter of the practice, rather
than on any positive normative basis.101
Although this Article addresses the popular and national sover-
eignty concerns attached to comparative reasoning, thereby establish-
ing that comparative constitutionalism is not an illegitimate mode of
adjudication per se, this Article 'is not advocating an automatic import
of foreign legal principles in every instance of adjudication. While the
legitimacy of a comparative survey is not at issue, the applicability of a
specific foreign norm or institution may be at issue. Undeniably, con-
stitutions emerge and reflect particular national circumstances and
identities; therefore, to justify the use of comparative resources,
judges have to appeal to the normative value of the materials and as-
sess how they would tie in with their countries' own history, culture,
and experience. Admittedly, the bricolage process might be no differ-
ent in principle from ordinary common-law reasoning, but the same
normative objection to the bricolage process does not exist when fed-
eral courts randomly cite state cases, and vice versa, or when Com-
monwealth Caribbean courts receive English cases. In the former, the
case law, though different, emerge from the same national polity, and
to varying degree is subject to the revision of the United States Su-
preme Court, the parental legal order. In the latter, cases from the
Commonwealth Caribbean can be appealed to the Privy Council in
the United Kingdom, thereby justifying the reception of English
precedents by the lower national courts.
Nevertheless, when materials are randomly drawn from outside
the legal polity, the concern that these sources may not be applicable
is left unaddressed. The danger with bricolage is that it permits the
adjudicator to skip the justificatory process and merely import the
cases on the ground that they are available, with no attempt made to
analyze whether these same norms are applicable in the domestic le-
gal system. The absence of an overt engagement with the normative
value of the comparative resources opens their reception to abuse.
When judges are allowed to "simply use what they find lying
around,"' 0 2 they may end up selecting foreign case law that supports
their views and omitting those that contradicts their positions. Conse-
quently, the absence of a normative basis for justifying comparative
100. Id. at 1238.
101. Id. at 1237.
102. Id. at 1304.
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constitutionalism makes the bricolage process an unsuitable mode of
constitutional interpretation.
On the other hand, Professor Choudhry argues that since "some
constitutions are often tied together by complicated relationships of
genealogy and history,' 0 3 prima facie relevance of each other's case
law is established without the need for "an interpreting court to come
to a nuanced understanding of the rationales underlying comparative
jurisprudence."'10 4 I would argue otherwise.
This genealogical mode of interpretation seeks to establish
linkage with the comparative resources, not on the basis that there are
prevailing commitments to common normative premises, but on a
shared inherited past. The method of comparative reasoning wrongly
assumes that each sovereign nation emerging from the same parental
legal order or sharing the same common lineage would want to chart
the same constitutional future. The main danger with this line of ar-
gument is that it licenses courts to dispense with an exacting examina-
tion of the intrinsic merits and relevance of foreign case law and to
blindly accept the validity of the foreign practices on the basis that
there had been a common shared past between the constitutional sys-
tems. While a shared history between two constitutional systems would
make the case law from one jurisdiction "persuasive authority"10 in
the other, it does not sanction the careless import of comparative
materials that the genealogical mode of reasoning condones. When
legal materials are located outside the domestic resources, the positiv-
ist appeal of the law is absent; any weight they have must be justified
on normative grounds. As genealogical claims are positivist and con-
tent-independent, 10 6 they lack a normative premise to explain why
"the past commands of a sovereign should command obedience to-
day.' 0 7 If anything, the mindless adoption of foreign materials is in-
imical to the standing of a nation as a separate sovereign state.
IV. Five Modes of Comparative Reasoning
Common law courts around the world have enriched their do-
mestic adjudicatory process by using foreign materials in the five
aforementioned ways: diagnosis, exposition, affirmation, functional-
ism, and universalism. This judicial cross-fertilization occurs not be-
103. Choudhry, supra note 6, at 838.
104. Id. at 871.
105. See Patrick Glenn, Persuasive Authority, 32 McGmisL L.J. 261, 263-264 (1987).
106. Choudhry, supra note 6, at 870.
107. Id. at 892.
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cause the foreign decisions are in any way binding on the domestic
polity, but because courts appreciate that they are engaging in a "pro-
cess of collective judicial deliberation on a set of common
problems. °1 0 8 This section explores in-depth each of the five modes of
comparative reasoning.
A. Diagnosis
When comparative jurisprudence is used diagnostically, it is used
mainly to aid the court in framing the constitutional issue at hand.
Comparative legal materials are employed to identify and illustrate a
constitutional problem that exists commonly amongst many jurisdic-
tions. The national court does not need to engage in the merits of the
foreign decisions nor does it need to consider whether the foreign
sources are applicable locally. Instead, the domestic court merely uses
the comparative resources to highlight a common constitutional ail-
ment that plagues other nations, thereby warranting the court's own
attention. In a way, the foreign materials thus act as a backdrop for
the local courts to define the relevant issue for domestic
consideration.
1. Knight v. Florida
An illustration of a diagnostic use of comparative sources would
be Justice Breyer's dissent in the Court's denial of certiorari in Knight
v. Florida.10 9 In that case, the Supreme Court of the United States re-
fused to consider whether the Eighth Amendment prohibited, as
"cruel and unusual punishment," the execution of prisoners who have
spent twenty years or more on death row.110 Justice Breyer, dissenting
from the denial of certiorari, cited a wide range of foreign precedents,
not to endorse their constitutional merits, but to illustrate the press-
ing necessity for the Court to consider the constitutional propriety of
long delays in executions within the American framework." '
Justice Breyer canvassed two lines of conflicting foreign treat-
ments on this issue, observing that the Privy Council, Supreme Courts
of India, and Supreme Court of Zimbabwe had decided that lengthy
delays in administering a lawful death penalty would render the ulti-
mate execution inhuman and unusually cruel, while noting that the
108. Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial Communication, 29 U. Ricti. L.
REV. 99, 119 (1994).
109. 528 U.S. 990 (1999).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 997 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Supreme Court of Canada1 12 had found otherwise.11 3 Justice Breyer
did not argue in support of any particular outcome, but proposed that
the existence of an excessive execution delay might implicate a consti-
tutional issue worthy of consideration. 1 4 By exploring the constitu-
tional jurisprudence of foreign courts that had considered "roughly
comparable questions under roughly comparable legal standards,"' 1 5
Justice Breyer urged the Supreme Court of the United States to enter
the fray of this debate and not abdicate its constitutional duty to re-
solve an important legal issue) 16
2. Foster v. Florida
In Foster v. Florida,117 the Supreme Court of United States again
denied a writ of certiorari from an accused who had been on death
row for more than twenty years.1 18 Justice Breyer, in his dissent from
the Court's denial of certiorari, once again adopted a diagnostic use
of comparative materials. He noted that the Privy Council, the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights, and, more recently the Supreme Court
of Canada, had all held that lengthy incarceration before execution
was degrading, shocking, or cruel. 119 It is instructive to note that
Breyer was not arguing that these foreign decisions would lead the
Court to hold that the existence of the "death row phenomenon" in
American penitentiaries violated the Eighth Amendment. Instead the
main thrust of his arguments was that the resolution of similar cases
by the highest courts in foreign jurisdictions underscored a pressing
need for the United States Supreme Court to address this dilemma for
its own domestic audience.1 20 The foreign trend thus justified the pe-
titioner to ask whether such punishment is both unusual and cruel in
America.
3. Washington v. Glucksberg
The Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court has also
used comparative constitutional materials diagnostically. In Washing-
112. The Supreme Court of Canada had subsequently overruled the decision Kindlerv.
Minister of Justice, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779 in United States v. Burns, [1991] 195 D.L.R. (4th) 1.
113. Knight, 528 U.S. at 995-96.
114. Id. at 999.
115. Id. at 997 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 997-99.
117. 537 U.S. 990 (2002).
118. Id. at 991 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 992-93.
120. Id. at 993.
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ton v. Glucksberg,12 1 Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the main opinion in
which the Court held that Washington's statutory prohibition against
assisted suicide was not in violation of a terminally ill patient's consti-
tutional right to due process.122
Rehnquist began his opinion by providing a sketch of how laws
against suicides and assisted suicides developed in the United States,
by tracing their roots to Anglo-American common law traditions that
were later codified as statutory criminal sanctions. 123 One could see
that herein, Chief Justice Rehnquist was merely framing the issue of
assisted suicide in context. This overview of state practices culminated
in a footnote reference to two conflicting lines of judicial authorities:
Other countries are embroiled in similar debates: The Supreme
Court of Canada recently rejected a claim that the Canadian Char-
ter of Rights and Freedoms establishes a fundamental right to as-
sisted suicide . . . . On the other hand, on May 20, 1997,
Colombia's Constitutional Court legalized voluntary euthanasia for
terminally ill people. 124
Rehnquist did not embellish these comparative citations with a
commentary on the merits of the cases. He merely noted that other
courts had been confronted with similar debates on euthanasia. 25 Es-
sentially, he was using the comparative legal materials to illustrate a
constitutional theme that had surfaced in several jurisdictions, thereby
justifying the intervention of the Supreme Court to address the issue
for the American public. After setting out the problem, Rehnquist re-
solved this constitutional issue by referencing only domestic case law.
Ergo, it is apparent that while the ChiefJustice may be receptive to the
use of comparative cases in the diagnosis of a constitutional ailment,
he shuns foreign aid in its treatment.
B. Exposition
An expository use of comparative jurisprudence allows courts to
engage with foreign sources, with the sole purpose of differentiating
the constitutional cultures and in the process, justify/explain its own
unique position. The comparative exercise is undertaken with the aim
of exemplifying and underscoring the inherent differences between
121. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
122. Id. at 705-06.
123. Id. at 711-13.
124. Id. at 718, n.16 (citing Rodriquez v. Attorney Gen. of Can. [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519;
Sentencia No. C-239/97 (Corte Constitucional, May 20, 1997)). See also Associated Press,
Colombia's Top Court Legalizes Euthanasia; the Terminally Ill Must Have Given Their Consent.
Each Death Will Pose a Conflict, the Top Jurist Said, ORLANDO SENTINEL, May 22, 1997, at A18.
125. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 718 n.16.
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the local and foreign constitutions. By comparing domestic and for-
eign constitutional practices, courts can, in the process, sharpen an
understanding of its own constitutional culture and justify its judicial
will to differ. This is an expository tool as the comparative exercise
allows the court to explain and justify why the local law deviates from
foreign practices. As observed by Pierre Lepaulle:
When one is immersed in his own law, in his own country, unable
to see things from without, he has a psychologically unavoidable
tendency to consider as natural, as necessary ... things which are
simply due to historical accident or temporary social situation ....
To see things in their true light, we must see them from a certain
distance, as stranger, which is impossible when we study... phe-
nomena of our own country. 126
A heightened awareness of foreign experiences and comparative
insights is often the essential first step for domestic courts to work out
their own approaches to resolving problems. By filtering foreign ex-
periences through the sieve of local conditions,judges can interrogate
how existing doctrines are consistent with their deepest values; this in
turn leads to a greater level of self-awareness that sharpens and does
not blunt the constitutional state's national distinctiveness.
1. Attorney General v. Barry Wain
The High Court of Singapore in Attorney General v. Barry Wain 127
had to decide whether the common law of contempt was in violation
of a citizen's right to freedom of expression. In that decision, the
court was adamant about not following Canadian and American case
law dealing with contempt of court, emphasizing instead that it was
important "not [to] lose sight of local conditions."12 As it still stands,
under Singapore law, the onus is on the speaker to prove that his con-
temptuous words are true. In contrast, in Canada, it had to be proved
that the accused acted willfully or with reckless disregard so that harm
to the administration of justice was a reasonable consequence of his
words/actions. 129 Nonetheless, the Singapore court did engage with
comparative jurisprudence and took some pains to explain why the
local courts should depart from foreign practices. The court stressed
that the law on contempt of court in Singapore was derived from the
126. Pierre Lepaulle, The Function of Comparative Law: With a Critique of Sociologicaljuris-
prudence, 35 HARV. L. REv. 838, 858 (1922).
127. Attorney Gen. v. Barry Wain, [19911 2 M.L.J. 525 (Sing.).
128. Id. at 531 (internal quotations omitted).
129. Regina v. Kopyto, [1987] 47 D.L.R1 (4th) 213, 214.
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old English common law position. 130 In contrast, the common law in
England had been altered subsequently by a new statute, and deci-
sions from Canada were based on the Canadian Charter, "which has
no parallel in Singapore."'131 The court also highlighted the fact that
unlike other Commonwealth jurisdictions, the judge in Singapore was
both a trier of fact and law; scandalous remarks imputing judicial bias
would thus "potentially have a more damning effect on [his] judicial
reputation" 132 than on his foreign counterparts.
Regardless of whether one agrees with the court's legal argu-
ments for deviating from foreign practices, 13 3 this case illustrates an
expository use of comparative materials where the court engaged with
foreign law so as to differentiate local culture from foreign norms and
justify why Singapore was charting a separate constitutional path.
2. S. v. Mamabolo
Interestingly, the Constitutional Court of South Africa came to
the same conclusion as the Singapore court and upheld the constitu-
tionality of the common law of contempt.134 Justice Kriegler, writing
for the majority in S. v. Mamabolo,135 exhorted caution when South
African courts sought to transplant First Amendment doctrines into
local jurisprudence. In distinguishing the two constitutional regimes,
Kriegler pointed to the terse, direct, and peremptory language of the
First Amendment, which reflected the libertarian aspirations of the
Founding Fathers, while explaining that the South African Constitu-
tion's more nuanced and qualified phraseology spoke to the Framers'
intent of creating a more balanced and counterpoised instrument.1 36
In addition, Justice Kriegler was emphatic about how the social
values underpinning the South African and the United States consti-
tutions differed:
The fundamental reason why the test evolved under the First
Amendment cannot lock on to our crime of scandalizing the court,
is because our Constitution ranks the right to freedom of expres-
sion differently. With us it is not a pre-eminent freedom ranking
above all others .... Moreover, the [South African] Constitution,
130. Attorney Gen. v. Barry Wain, [1991] 2 M.L.J. 525, 531 (Sing.).
131. Id.
132. Thio Li-ann, An 'z'for and 'I Singapore's Communitarian Model of Constitutional Adju-
dication, 27 H.K.L.J. 152, 175 (1997).
133. For a critique of the legal reasoning of this case see Michael Hor & Collin Seah,
Selected Issues in the Freedom of Speech and Expression in Singapore, 12 SING. L. REv. 296 (1991).
134. 2001 (1) SACR 686 (CC) (S.Afr.).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 705.
Summer 2005] 1025
in its opening statement and repeatedly thereafter, proclaims three
conjoined, reciprocal and covalent values to be foundational to the
Republic: human dignity, equality and freedom. With us the right
to freedom of expression cannot be said automatically to trump
the right to human dignity. The right to dignity is at least as worthy
of protection as is the right to freedom of expression.1
37
Therefore, in light of South Africa's constitutional focus on the
value of human dignity, the citizenry's right to the freedom of expres-
sion is not conferred the same level of superior status as it is in the
United States. Herein, by filtering the foreign doctrines through the
prism of local experience, Justice Kriegler was able to clarify how ex-
isting domestic doctrines were more consonant with the intrinsic val-
ues of the South African constitutional polity; this in turn led to a
greater level of self-awareness that sharpened the state's national
distinctiveness.
3. Raines v. Byrd
In Raines v. Byrd,138 the Supreme Court of the United States had
to consider whether a group of Congressional members had institu-
tional standing under Article III of the United States Constitution to
challenge the constitutionality of the Line Item Veto Act.' 3 9 ChiefJus-
tice Rehnquist noted that "some European constitutional courts oper-
ate under one or another variant of such a regime,' 1 40 which
permitted institutional standing by legislators in similar situations.
While the Court conceded that there "would be nothing irrational"'14 1
in adopting such an approach, Rehnquist argued that "it is obviously
not the regime that has obtained under our Constitution to date. Our
regime contemplates a more restricted role for Article II."142
By juxtaposing the more flexible European systems alongside the
more restrictive approach of the United States, the Court was able to
underscore the unique features of the American Constitution. This
expository use of the comparative materials highlights the special con-
stitutional limits placed by Article III on the courts to adjudicate over
specific case or controversy where the plaintiff has suffered personal
and particularized harm. The role of the American judiciary is to pro-
tect "individual citizens and minority groups against oppressive or dis-
137. Id. at 705-06.
138. 521 U.S. 811 (1997).
139. Id. at 813-14.
140. Id. at 828.
141. Id.
142. Id.
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criminatory government action,"143 and unlike some European
models, it is not created to ensure "some amorphous general supervi-
sion of the operations of government. 1 44
4. Reference re Electoral Boundaries Commission
In Reference re Electoral Boundaries Commission,1 45 the Supreme
Court of Canada was asked to decide whether the variances in size of
voter populations amongst the Saskatchewan provincial constituen-
cies, as recommended by the Electoral Boundaries Commission, vio-
lated the Charter guarantee of the right to vote. 146 In declining to
uphold the "one person one vote" model espoused by the United
States Supreme Court,147 the majority appealed to the differences in
history and traditions underpinning Canadian society:
[D]emocracy in Canada is rooted in a different history than in the
United States .... Its origins lie not in the debates of the founding
fathers, but in the less absolute recesses of the British tradition ....
It was a tradition of evolutionary democracy.., a tradition which,
even in its more modern phases, accommodates significant devia-
tion from the ideals of equal representation .... The concept of
absolute voter parity does not accord with the development of the
right to vote in the Canadian context and does not permit of suffi-
cient flexibility to meet the practical difficulties inherent in repre-
sentative government in a country such as Canada. 1 48
Eventually, in light of the need to recognize different cultural
and group identities and to accommodate diversity in the electoral
process, the majority judges held that an electoral system that focused
on effective representation was more important than one that empha-
sized mathematical parity as exemplified in the United States electoral
system. By interrogating the practices in America and Canada, the Su-
preme Court of Canada was able to identify how effective representa-
tion was integral to Canada's democracy and consonant with its
unique aspirations to weave diversity into the social mosaic.
5. Regina v. Keegstra
The Supreme Court of Canada in Regina v. Keegstra'49 upheld the
constitutionality of a penal statute which prohibited the willful promo-
143. Id. at 829.
144. Id.
145. [1991] 2 S.C.R. 158.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 188.
148. Id. at 186, 189.
149. Regina v. Keegstra, [1990] S.C.R. 697.
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tion of hatred towards any section of the public distinguished by
color, race, or religion. The impugned provision was challenged as a
violation of the applicants' constitutional right to the freedom of
expression.
It was significant how the Supreme Court of Canada approached
the American jurisprudence on hate propaganda. The majority was
very thorough in exploring the applicability of the American case law
and held specifically that "it is important to be explicit as to the rea-
sons why or why not American experience may be useful"1 50 in the
Charter analysis. They acknowledged that the "practical and theoreti-
cal experience" 15 1 to be gleaned from American constitutionalism was
immense and "should not be overlooked by Canadian courts, ' 15 2 but
nonetheless, the majority recognized that differences may require Ca-
nada's constitutional vision to depart from that endorsed in the
United States. '15 3
In Keegstra, the expository use of comparative jurisprudence was
affirmed as the court expressed their enthusiasm in drawing from the
well of American constitutionalism as long as the foreign doctrines
undergo domestic distillation. Particularly instructive was ChiefJustice
Dickson's examination of Canada's fundamental values and how they
differ from America's:
The special role given equality and multiculturalism in the Cana-
dian Constitution necessitates a departure from the view, reasona-
bly prevalent in America at present, that the suppression of hate
propaganda is incompatible with the guarantee of free expression
.... If values fundamental to the Canadian conception of a free
and democratic society suggest an approach that denies hate prop-
aganda the highest degree of constitutional protection, it is this
approach which must be employed. 15 4
By juxtaposing the legal traditions of both countries, the Cana-
dian court in the process has clarified its own understanding of the
country's own constitutional culture. The expository use of compara-
tive resources underscores the cultural distinctiveness of Canada and
highlights how the Canadian social vision departs from the American
one.
150. Id. at 740.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Regina v. Keegstra, [1990] 114 A.R. 81, 125-26.
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C. Affirmation
When courts make an affirmative use of comparative resources,
they essentially use foreign materials to confirm a legal result they
have reached on their own interpretation of domestic law. This search
for parallel citations outside the domestic polity is often a calculated
move by the courts. These citations buttress the precedential value of
the decision or enhance the persuasiveness of the new principle being
formulated. By demonstrating how other courts or legislatures have
reached the same constitutional destination, as noted by William N.
Eskridge:
One way for a judge to know to be more certain that she is not
reading her own views into the Constitution's open-textured provi-
sions is to see if differently situated judges elsewhere in the world
are reaching the same normative judgment. If they are, an Ameri-
can jurist can be more confident that her judgment reflects some
objective normative reality or consensus and notjust her own pref-
erences or ideology. 155
The following cases illustrate how courts have used foreign legal
sources in an affirmative sense, whereby the legitimacy of a domestic
practice is enhanced by the consensus it shares with an external legal
polity.
1. Thompson v. Oklahoma
In deciding whether the execution of minors below sixteen years
of age at the time of the capital offense was cruel and unusual, the
majority of the United States Supreme Court in Thompson v.
OklahomaI56 surveyed contemporary standards of decency as evi-
denced by the practices of state legislatures. Justice Stevens's examina-
tion of the existing penal statutes and state practices led him to
conclude that the execution of such youthful prisoners was disap-
proved by an overwhelming majority of states. 157 After his extensive
survey of domestic state practices, Justice Stevens interestingly cast his
eye beyond the constitutional shores of America:
The conclusion that it would offend civilized standards of decency to
execute a person who was less than 16 years old at the time of his
or her offense is consistent with the views that have been expressed by
respected professional organizations, by other nations that share
155. William N. Eskridge, Jr., United States: Lawrence v. Texas and the Imperative of Com-
parative Constitutionalism, 2. INT'LJ. CONST. L. 555, 557 (2004).
156. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
157. Id. at 829 n.29.
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our Anglo-American heritage, and by leading members of the
Western European community. 1
58
Justice Stevens provided a laundry list of countries, which included
the United Kingdom, Australia, Germany, France, Portugal, the
Netherlands, the Scandinavian countries, and the then Soviet Union,
that prohibited juvenile executions. 159 It is crucial to note Justice Ste-
vens's emphasis that his views were consistent with foreign practices,
highlighting the fact that these comparative sources only consolidated
his views and had not shaped it. He was essentially making an affirma-
tive use of comparative resources to buttress the persuasiveness of the
new constitutional rule he was articulating. While the foreign trend
may have enhanced the weight of his argument, his response was not
formed nor supplemented by these international practices.
2. Atkins v. Virginia
In Atkins v. Virginia,160 Justice Stevens once again undertook the
same methodological approach as he did in Thompson to deem the
execution of the mentally retarded cruel and unusual. 16 1 By surveying
state penal statutes across the country and the state practices, he con-
cluded on behalf of the majority that a national consensus had devel-
oped against the execution of the mentally ill. 1 62 To augment his
conclusion, Stevens once again turned to comparative law for support,
albeit this time in a footnote:
Moreover, within the world community, the imposition of the
death penalty for crimes committed by mentally retarded offenders
is overwhelmingly disapproved .... Although these factors are by
no means dispositive, their consistency with the legislative evidence
lends further support to our conclusion that there is a consensus
among those who have addressed the issue.1 65
This somewhat coy use of comparative resources betrays the Supreme
Court's discomfort, even amongst the liberal and moderate judges,
with using foreign case law to strike down a domestic statute. By plac-
ing these comparative sources in a footnote, Justice Stevens was signal-
ing to the dissent and the readership at large that these resources
were not crucial to shaping his view but were merely cited as addi-
tional evidence to affirm his decision. In the rest of his Eighth Amend-
ment analysis, Justice Stevens did not refer to comparative sources
158. Id. at 830 (emphasis added).
159. Id. at 830-831.
160. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
161. Id. at 311-21.
162. Id. at 316.
163. Id. at 316 n.21 (emphasis added).
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 391030
again. The subtle implication that the majority had reached their deci-
sion on the basis of domestic law was abundantly clear.
3. Lawrence v. Texas
In Lawrence,164 a majority in the Supreme Court held that Texas's
penal prohibition against private, consensual homosexual sex violated
a person's right to due process, and thus overruled its older decision
in Bowers.165 Although some may consider this decision a break-
through for comparative constitutionalism in the United States, it is
imperative to note that the majority only cited foreign case law in two
instances. With regard to the first, in referencing the European deci-
sion of Dudgeon v. United Kingdom,166 Justice Kennedy did not argue
that Bowers was bad law in light of this European Court of Human
Rights decision.1 67 Instead, he was merely using Dudgeon, which was
decided five years before Bowers, to expose the flaw in Chief Justice
Burger's previous claim that homosexual behavior was antithetical to
the values of Western civilization. 168
In the second instance, Justice Kennedy merely made affirmative
use of foreign case law. It is crucial to note that the Court eventually
overruled Bowers on the basis that it was inconsistent with its own deci-
sions in Casey169 and Romer v. Evans,170 both of which were decided
after Bowers v. Hardwick. In Casey, the Court affirmed that the most
intimate and personal choices of a human being, central to her per-
sonal dignity and autonomy, are protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.' 71 Later, in Romer, the Court invalidated an amendment to
Colorado's constitution that sought to deprive homosexuals of protec-
tion under state antidiscrimination laws on the basis that the change
was born of animosity toward gays and lesbians and had no rational
relation to a legitimate governmental purpose. 172 It was only afterJus-
tice Kennedy concluded that Bowers had sustained serious erosion
from these recent Supreme Court decisions that he turned to compar-
ative case law to affirm and buttress his view that the Texas statute in
question was unconstitutional: "Other nations, too, have taken action
164. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
165. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
166. 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 149 (1982).
167. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573.
168. Id. at 572-573.
169. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
170. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
171. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846.
172. Romer, 517 U.S. at 632.
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consistent with an affirmation of the protected right of homosexual
adults to engage in intimate, consensual conduct .... The right the
petitioners seek in this case has been accepted as an integral part of
human freedom in many other countries. 17 3 Justice Kennedy did not
use any of the doctrinal frameworks utilized by the European Court to
scrutinize how state intervention into the private sphere of the citi-
zenry was unwarranted in this instance. Neither did the Court make
any concession on how transnational norms should shape the bounda-
ries of the domestic constitutional jurisprudence. Essentially, Justice
Kennedy used the foreign precedents to reinforce the majority's deci-
sion and to enhance the objective nature of the Court's decision.
4. Roper v. Simmons
In the recent decision of Roper v. Simmons,174 the United States
Supreme Court held that it is cruel and unusual for States to execute
prisoners who were juveniles at the time the capital crime was commit-
ted.175 Interestingly, the value and use of foreign legal materials was
discussed extensively by both the majority and the dissent.
In writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy explicitly held that
juvenile executions were unconstitutional because a national consen-
sus had developed against their use. He noted that thirty states in the
United States prohibited juvenile death penalty and in twenty others,
the practice was infrequent.176 This notation highlighted that the con-
sistency of change by the states in the direction of abolishing juvenile
capital punishment formed the basis of the Court's decision, and such
a blanket national prohibition was constitutionally mandated.
It was only after the Court invalidated the Missouri law at issue
using domestic indicia that the majority turned to foreign materials to
buttress their decision: "Our determination that the death penalty is
disproportionate punishment for offenders under 18 finds confirma-
tion in the stark reality that the United States is the only country in the
world that continues to give official sanction to the juvenile death
penalty."' 77 In his opinion, Justice Kennedy noted the litany of inter-
national covenants prohibiting juvenile death penalty17 8 and the fact
173. 539 U.S. at 576-77 (2003) (emphasis added).
174. 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005).
175. Id. at 1198.
176. Id. at 1192.
177. Id. at 1198 (emphasis added).
178. Id. at 1199 (citing United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, the
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, American Convention of Human
Rights, African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child).
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that the United States was one of only eight countries in the world
who had executed juveniles since 1990 to affirm the precept that "the
opinion of the world community, while not controlling our outcome,
does provide respected and significant confirmation for our
conclusions." 17
9
In response to Scalia's dissent that such an approach would be
inconsistent with the Framers' original understanding of the Constitu-
tion, Justice Kennedy retorted: "It does not lessen our fidelity to the
Constitution, or our pride in its origins to acknowledge that the ex-
press affirmation of certain fundamental rights by other nations and
peoples simply underscores the centrality of those same rights within
our own heritage of freedom." 180
While dissenting from this decision, Justice O'Connor was quick
to disavow Justice Scalia's parochial understanding of the American
Constitution. She decided against the petitioner because she was not
convinced that there was a genuine national consensus against the ju-
venile death penalty.' 81 But if this had been established, she would
have no qualms about using the "international consensus of this na-
ture . . . to confirm the reasonableness of a consonant and genuine
American consensus.182 As she emphasized:
[T] his Nation's evolving understanding of human dignity certainly
is neither wholly isolated from, nor inherently at odds with, the
values prevailing in other countries. On the contrary, we should
not be surprised to find congruence between domestic and inter-
national values .... 183
The Roper decision is groundbreaking to the extent that the
Court was more explicit about their receptivity to engaging with for-
eign legal materials. Unlike Atkins, where the majority confined their
comparative study to a meager footnote, in Roper, the judges were un-
abashed about analyzing the implications of foreign materials in the
main text. Nonetheless, the judges were also anxious to emphasize
that these foreign sources were only meant to augment local sources,
not displace them. In this regard, unfortunately, Roper has in no way
advanced the comparative cause. To the extent that the foreign mater-
ials are used only to buttress the conclusions the judges have already
reached on domestic grounds, comparative study in no way facilitates
179. Id. at 1200.
180. Id. (emphasis added).
181. Id. at 1206 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
182. Id. at 1216 (emphasis added).
183. Id. at 1215-16.
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the adjudicatory process, and its value lies merely in the enhancement
of the persuasiveness of the judicial decisions.
It is not the intention of this Article to explore in detail Scalia's
dissent in Roper. His tirade is, in essence, a rehash of his earlier argu-
ments against comparative constitutionalism raised in Lawrence and
Thompson. However, he did make a novel and valid point when he
criticized the majority for only considering foreign law when the
Eighth Amendment was at issue and disavowing overseas decisions
when other constitutional provisions, such as the First and the Four-
teenth Amendment, were challenged. 1 84 As he lamented:
The Court should either profess its willingness to reconsider all
these matters in light of the views of foreigners, or else it should
cease putting forth foreigners' views as part of its reasoned basis of its
decisions. To invoke alien law when it agrees with one's own think-
ing, and ignore it otherwise, is not reasoned decision making but
sophistry.18 5
Leaving aside the fact thatJustice Scalia himself has been guilty of
cherry-picking, 186 as a matter of judicial consistency, the Court may
want to take up Scalia's challenge and survey foreign decisions regard-
less of which constitutional provision was being challenged. If the
Court only assigns an affirmative role to foreign legal materials, as a
matter of logic or practicality, it should not matter which constitu-
tional right is at stake. Since the Court would reach its decision on the
basis of the domestic sources alone, the casting of a wider comparative
net should in no way affect the indigenousness of the domestic system
the Court is so quick to protect.
D. Functionalism
Functionalists perceive courts as similarly constituted institutions
performing the same tasks common to all systems of governance.
Tushnet observes that comparativism is inevitable and natural when
one subscribes to a functional use of foreign materials, for only when
one compares different political systems, can one identify the func-
tions common to all and the institutions that serve them.187
When comparative sources are used functionally, the national
court's focus is on learning from foreign jurisdictions by drawing on
their constitutional experiences. The foreign jurisprudence is used as
a preceptive tool to guide the domestic court in reaching a decision
184. Id. at 1228 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
185. Id. (emphasis added).
186. See discussion supra Part II.
187. Tushnet, supra note 5, at 1228.
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when a similar issue confronts them. In turn, courts might move to-
ward homogeneity in their judicial response to the same constitu-
tional dilemmas as they are all drawn by the intrinsic logical force of
the foreign constitutional discourse. As pointed out by the Constitu-
tional Court of South Africa in Sanderson, "[c]omparative research is
generally valuable and is all the more so when dealing with problems
new to our jurisprudence but well developed in mature constitutional
democracies" 188 Comparative studying might lead courts to find two
conflicting lines of authorities; in evaluating the normative positions
of both constitutional positions, the judges can identify the most func-
tional constitutional paradigm that warrants domestic assimilation. A
functional use of comparative jurisprudence thus allows courts to ex-
plore constitutional options and draw from the vast repository of
knowledge available beyond national boundaries. In the process,
courts may find better solutions to the status quo or be cognizant of
potential pitfalls to avoid when engaging in constitutional adjudica-
tion. The following cases demonstrate ways in which courts have used
the functional mode of comparative reasoning to avoid such pitfalls.
1. United States v. Then
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
United States v. Then' 89 considered an equal protection challenge to
the disparity between the sentences meted out to crack and powder
cocaine offenders.
In a concurring opinionJudge Calabresi referred to the constitu-
tional practices in Germany and Italy where the courts had adopted
the practice of judicial forewarning as opposed to a direct nullifica-
tion of unconstitutional legislations.1 90 Calabresi did not adopt Chief
Justice Rehnquist's approach in Raines and merely uphold the Marbuiy
v. Madison1 91 mode of judicial review as uniquely American, and
therefore unassailable. Instead, he justified his turn to comparative
sources on the basis that all judges confronted a common constitu-
tional dilemma when faced with state statutes that had "been made
irrational by the passage of time, change of circumstances, or the
availability of new knowledge."1 92
188. Sanderson v. Att'y Gen., 1998 (2) SA 38(CC) at 53 (S. Mr.).
189. 56 F.3d 464 (2d Cir. 1995).
190. Id. at 468-69.
191. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
192. Then, 56 F.3d at 468.
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After observing that courts were performing this same constitu-
tional function, the solution Calabresi conceived in response to this
uncertainty over the degree of legislative (in)action necessary before
judicial intervention was warranted, was to recommend the Continen-
tal courts' method of providing legislative notice prior to actual nulli-
fication of statutes. In endorsing the Continental approach, the
learned judge justified his functional use of comparative resources on
the basis that the foreign variations ofjudicial review, were "our 'con-
stitutional offspring' and how they have dealt with problems analo-
gous to ours can be very useful to us when we face difficult
constitutional issues. Wise parents do not hesitate to learn from their
children. 1 93
2. Printz v. United States
In Printz,194 the majority of the United States Supreme Court held
that the impugned provisions of the Brady Act were unconstitutional,
as they failed to adhere to the design and structure of the federal con-
stitutional scheme. 195
Justice Breyer, in his dissenting opinion, examined a variety of
federal systems in Europe and argued that a comparative "experience
may nonetheless cast an empirical light on the consequences of differ-
ent solutions to a common legal problem.1 9 6 He believed that by ana-
lyzing European experiences, America may discover a system that
better serves the purpose of reconciling central authority with state
autonomy. 197 In support of this view, he pointed to the fact that in
"some other countries facing the same basic problem,"' 98 it was usual
for state bureaucracies to implement federal law. Justice Breyer clearly
wanted to undertake a functional use of comparative resources
whereby an evaluative comparison of federal systems would furnish an
"empirical confirmation"' 99 of the most ideal solution.
193. Id. at 469.
194. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
195. Id. at 933.
196. Id. at 977 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
197. Id.
198. Id. at 976.
199. Id. at 971.
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3. H.K. Sar v Ng Kung Siu
In H.K. Sar v. Ng Kung Siu,200 the Hong Kong Court of Final Ap-
peal held that the Special Administrative Region's criminal prohibi-
tion against the desecration of the national flag was not in violation of
the accused's constitutional right to freedom of expression. 20 1 Particu-
larly pertinent to our purpose is Justice Bokhary PJ's concurring opin-
ion, where he adopted a functional use of comparative resources
when surveying the constitutional experiences of other liberal democ-
racies. He first noted that in America, the United States Supreme
Court had struck down both state20 2 and federal 20 3 statutes criminaliz-
ing desecration of the American flag, albeit each decision was carried
by a bare majority of five to four. The judge went on to contrast the
American experience with the constitutional decisions of Italy2° 4 and
Germany, 20 5 where the courts upheld the constitutionality of laws that
protect the national flag and render breaches punishable by a fine or
imprisonment. Faced with two conflicting lines of authorities, Bokhary
stated:
There are, it seems to me, essentially two coherent approaches in this
area of constitutional law. One approach would be to say that even
though there are always far more effective ways of making a point
than by desecrating the national or regional flag or emblem, such
desecration, however boorish and offensive, should nevertheless be
tolerated as a form of expression. The other approach would be to
say that by reason of the reverence due to them for what they re-
present and because so protecting them would never prevent any-
one from getting his or her point across in any one or more of a
wide variety of ways, those flags and emblems should be protected
from desecration. 20 6
It was only after examining both lines of authorities and assessing
their normative merits that the judge came to the conclusion that the
current safeguards to the sanctity of the national emblem in Hong
Kong could be reconciled with the constitutional protection accorded
200. H.K. Sar v. Ng Kung Siu & Another, Special Admin. Region, [1999] 3 HKLRD 907
(C.F.A.).
201. Id. at 926.
202. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1988).
203. United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1989).
204. See Re Paris Renato, (Corte Suprema di Cassazione, Judgment No 1218, General
Registry No 3355 of 1988, unreported) (Court of Cassation of Italy).
205. See Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Mar. 7,
1990, 81 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 278 (F.R.G.) (empha-
sis added).
206. H. Sar v. Ng Kung Siu & Another, [1999] 3 H.KL.R.D. 907, 932 (C.F.A.) (em-
phasis added).
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to a citizen's right to free speech. As he observed, the ban did not
affect the substance of expression but touched "upon the mode of
expression only to the extent of keeping flags and emblems impar-
tially beyond politics and strife."207 In the end, by exploring the vast
constitutional resources outside the national borders, the judge
reached the conclusion that the national flag was an intrinsic, solemn
representation of statehood, and a prohibition against its desecration
would only constitute a minimal impairment of a person's right to
expression. He thus endorsed the European line of legal authorities as
functionally more suited to the governance of Hong Kong.
E. Universalism
Some advocates of comparative constitutionalism speak of certain
universal principles that are embedded in the law of the community,
which may be discovered if judges engage in a universal use of com-
parative materials. 208 This use of comparative jurisprudence allows
courts to examine the universal, or transcendent moral truths, discov-
ered by their foreign brethren, with the eventual aim of incorporating
them domestically. In the words of Sujit Choudhry, universalists sub-
scribe to the notion that "constitutional guarantees are cut from a uni-
versal cloth"20 9 and hence comparative sources would be eminently
useful as "all constitutional courts are engaged in the identification,
interpretation, and application of the same set of norms."210
This assimilation of foreign materials into the domestic fabric
may arise out of the judicial recognition that norms in some measure
may be explicable in terms of certain universals that transcend na-
tional boundaries. This recognition of global human rights does not
translate into the anointing of one specific tribunal with the final au-
thority to adjudicate over these rights; instead this power is dispersed
amongst all national courts to interpret and apply these rights such
that courts around the world resolve them in colloquy with one an-
other.21' In this instance, domestic courts are elaborating on, and in-
terpreting, common norms drawn from the same constitutive core
that resonates and animates through most if not all cultures. This sec-
tion explores several foreign cases highlighting this normative core.
207. Id. at 933.
208. See generally CHARLES COVELL, THE DEFENCE OF NATURAL LAW: A STUDY OF THE
IDEAS OF LAW AND JUSTICE IN THE WRITINGS OF LON L. FULLER, MICHAEL OAKESHOTr, F.A.
HAYEK, RONALD DWORKIN AND JOHN FINNIs (1992).
209. Choudry, supra note 6, at 825.
210. Id. (emphasis added).
211. Slaughter, supra note 108, at 122.
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1. Chng Suan Tze v. Minster of Home Affairs
In the landmark 1989 decision of Chng Suan Tze v. Minister of
Home Affairs,21 2 the Court of Appeal of Singapore decided that the
judiciary would "objectively" review the exercise of the President's dis-
cretion to detain persons under Sections 8 and 10 of the Internal Se-
curity Act, thereby overruling its previous decision that the President's
discretion was "subjective" and not open to judicial review.2 13 The
court decided that the Singapore courts would ascertain whether the
President's detention orders were issued on the basis of national se-
curity considerations, rather than accept his word at face value. 214 In
this decision, Chief Justice Wee Chong Jin noted the judicial trend
emanating from the Privy Council and that the highest courts in the
Commonwealth required the Head of States to furnish reasonable
grounds for a person's preventive detention.2 1 5 The conclusion he
drew was that "the time has come for us to recognize that the subjec-
tive test in respect of sections 8 and 10 of the ISA [Internal Security
Act] can no longer be supported." 21 6 More importantly, for our pur-
poses, ChiefJustice Wee premised the Court's new stance on the uni-
versalist understanding of the rule of law as illuminated by the
comparative constitutional discourse: "The notion of a subjective or
unfettered discretion is contrary to the rule of law. All power has legal
limits and the rule of law demands that the courts should be able to
examine the exercise of discretionary power."
21 7
In vindicating the rule of law in Singapore, Chief Justice Wee ap-
pealed to transnational principles to justify the epistemological trans-
plant into local soil. Although this decision was subsequently reversed
by a constitutional amendment truncating judicial review in national
security cases,2 1 8 Chng Suan Tze had laid down a groundbreaking legal
precedent in Singapore for the universalist approach to adjudication
to take root.
212. [1988] 1 S.L.R. 132 (Sing.).
213. Id. at 152.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 153.
216. Id. at 149.
217. Id. at 156.
218. Article 149 of the Singapore Constitution was amended to include a notwithstand-
ing clause, thereby exempting laws enacted on the grounds of national security from the
operation of constitutional liberties. The judiciary is also removed of any powers to invali-
date any such laws.
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2. S. v. Makwanyane
In S. v. Makwanyane,219 the Constitutional Court of South Africa
unanimously held that the use of capital punishment in the criminal
justice system was an unjustifiable violation of a person's right to life
and dignity.2 20 What is perhaps most striking about this decision is the
extensive embrace of comparative constitutionalism by all the judges.
The judges, in separate opinions, surveyed over a hundred cases ema-
nating from over ten nations.
Justice Mahomed was emphatic that "the dignity of all of us, in a
caring civilization,"' 22 1 must be compromised by the act of repeating,
systematically and deliberately, what society finds to be so repugnant
in the conduct of the offender in the first place. In the same vein,
Justice Mokgoro noticed the striking parallels between the Western
concepts of humanity and menswaardigheid and the ethos embraced by
the African notion of ubuntu: "Generally, ubuntu translates as hu-
maneness. In its most fundamental sense, it translates as personhood
and morality. While it envelops the key values of group solidarity,
compassion, respect, human dignity, conformity to basic norms and
collective unity, in its fundamental sense it denotes humanity and
morality."222
Similarly, Justice O'Regan declared that "human dignity is impor-
tant to all democracies," 223 as it is the "essence and the cornerstone of
democratic government."224 By appealing to the transcendence of hu-
manity that underpinned all societies, the judges were able to extract
a commonality between the intrinsic values of traditional African soci-
ety and the universal trend toward abolition of the death penalty. Es-
sentially, it was the employment of this universalist approach to
constitutional adjudication that permitted the court to vindicate a re-
gime change in the South African penal system.
3. S. v. Williams
The Constitutional Court of South Africa in S. v. Williams 225 inval-
idated the use of corporal punishment on juvenile offenders as cruel
219. 1995 (2) SACR 1 (CC) (S. Mr.).
220. Id. at 88.
221. Id. at 96.
222. Id. at 106.
223. Id. at 112.
224. Id.
225. 1995 (3) SA 632 (CC) (S.Afr.).
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and degrading.226 The court came to this conclusion after surveying
the judicial and legislative practices of Canada, United States, Austra-
lia, New Zealand, Europe, Namibia, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique. As
opined by the unanimous court, the comparative sources clearly
demonstrated "unmistakably a growing consensus in the international
community that judicial whipping... offends society's notions of de-
cency."227 Having identified this transcendent standard of decency,
the court felt that although it was not bound to follow the interna-
tional consensus, "neither can we ignore it."228 In fact, the Williams
court declared passionately that "the Constitution now offers an op-
portunity for South Africans to join the mainstream of a world com-
munity that is progressively moving away from punishments that place
undue emphasis on retribution and vengeance rather than on correc-
tion, prevention and the recognition of human rights."
229
It is instructive to note that the Constitutional Court held that the
international consensus against juvenile corporal punishment "found
expression through the courts and legislatures of various coun-
tries."230 Through this holding, it implicitly recognized that the
universality of certain norms need not be solely established by a supra-
national tribunal, but may be also articulated by a chorus of national
legislatures and courts around the world acting in tandem to explicate
norms that transcend national boundaries.
4. United States v. Burns
In United States v. Burns,231 the Supreme Court of Canada held
that the Minister of Justice was constitutionally bound to obtain an
assurance that the death penalty would not be sought against two Ca-
nadian fugitives as a condition for their extradition to the State of
Washington. 23 2 In reaching this decision, the court affirmed that the
constitutional principles of fundamental justice233 included "princi-
ples which have been recognized by ... international conventions"
234
226. Id.
227. Id. at 644.
228. Id. at 648.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 644.
231. [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283.
232. Id. at 296-97.
233. Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms states: "Every-
one has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived
thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice." Part I of the
Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 § 7 (U.K.).
234. [2001] 1. S.C.R. at 330.
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and that "the various sources of international human rights law ...
must... be relevant and persuasive sources for the interpretation of the
Charter's provisions." 23 5 In weighing the factors in favor and against
requiring extradition without assurance, the Supreme Court took
pains to explore the state practices that favored the abolition of death
penalty and the state practice amongst abolitionist states in requiring
such assurances. The court concluded that the evidence did not estab-
lish an international law norm against the death penalty, or against
extradition to face the death penalty. 236 However, it also noted that
the trend toward abolition in the Western democracies "mirrors and
perhaps corroborates the principles of fundamental justice"237 that
led to the abolition of the death penalty in Canada, thereby mandat-
ing such a Ministerial assurance.
The Burns decision illustrates how a universal use of comparative
jurisprudence could lead courts to discover transcendent principles
that warranted local incorporation. This judicial search for common
norms outside the domestic polity is premised on the understanding
that global courts are engaged in the common enterprise of ex-
pounding universal rights unconfined by national or political
demarcations.
Conclusion
Montesquieu, the father of comparative law, had observed that
"the political and civil laws of each nation .. .should be so appropri-
ate to the people for whom they are made that it is very unlikely that
the laws of one nation can suit another."238 According to this view, a
country's laws are intrinsically linked to its history, politics, and geog-
raphy, which is unique to itself, such that no comparative analysis "can
identify and take into account all the variables that might affect the
degree to which participants in one system can learn from the experi-
ence in others."23 9 Although more than two hundred years have
passed since Montesquieu's pessimistic warning, it would appear that
his ghost is still alive and well in the United States.
Legal particularists' concern that the haphazard import of com-
parative materials would compromise the integrity of the domestic
235. Id. at 330-31 (emphasis added).
236. Id. at 287.
237. Id. at 335.
238. CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MoN rESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAws 8 (Anne
M. Cohler Ed. & Trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1989) (1748).
239. Tushnet, supra note 5, at 1265.
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constitutional experience is largely misplaced as constitutional bor-
rowings do not imply a mindless transplant of entire bodies of legal
doctrine. The very nature of comparative analysis demands a rigorous
examination of whether the empirical conditions within a specific
area of consideration are conducive for "constitutional cross fertiliza-
tion. ' 240 Even the South African courts, which have been most zealous
in using comparative reasoning, have held that "the use of foreign
precedent requires circumspection and acknowledgment that trans-
plants require careful management."2 41 Similarly, the European Court
of Human Rights has acknowledged that signatory states are permit-
ted to implement the Convention with a "margin of appreciation,"
thus recognizing that socio-political differences may necessitate differ-
ential implementations in separate regions. 242 When empirical and
contextual variables have been properly considered, comparative con-
stitutional analysis can facilitate the identification of relevant conver-
gences in the different jurisdictions. This analysis consequently
provides an indication of the extent to which transplanted constitu-
tional materials would assume in their country of adoption the same
role they had played in their country of origin.243
Admittedly, the extent to which a constitutional state is suscepti-
ble to using comparative jurisprudence also depends on what it per-
ceives to be the country's constitutional model: "what it means to have
a constitution. '" 244 Specifically, Seth Kreimer has identified three such
constitutional models:
First, a constitution may be seen as the basic "operating system" by
which the political and legal mechanisms of a society are struc-
tured. Second, a constitution might be viewed as a series of moral
conceptions that constitute the best account of moral ideals by
which a society should be guided. Finally, a constitution may be
modeled as an element that defines national identity.2 45
Pursuant to these categorizations, he has argued that "the receptive-
ness of a system of constitutional law to borrowings from other systems
240. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 1103, 1116 (2000).
241. Sanderson v. Att'y Gen. of E. Cape, 1998 (2) SA 38, 53 (CC) (S.Afr.).
242. See Eyal Benvenisti, Margin of Appreciation, Consensus, and Universal Standards, 31
N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 843 (1999).
243. Michel Rosenfeld, Constitutional Migration and the Bounds of Comparative Analysis, 58
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 67 (2001).
244. Seth F. Kreimer, Invidious Comparisons: Some Cautionary Remarks on the Process of
Constitutional Borrowing, I U. PA. J. CONST. L. 640, 640 (1999).
245. Id.
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depends ... on which of these models governs the relevant constitu-
tional interpretation. 246
Regardless of which of the three constitutional models a court
may subscribe to, none of them forecloses the use of comparative
sources in constitutional adjudication. Even if one views the constitu-
tion as an embodiment of national identity, a diagnostic expository or
affirmative use of comparative materials, as explained above, would
only facilitate this process of self examination. Alternatively, if one
perceives the constitution to be an operating system, a functional use
of foreign sources would be licensed, as domestic courts would only
import features of other constitutional regimes "have shown them-
selves to be efficacious in advancing the goals our Constitution sets for
itself."247 Finally, for those who view the Constitution as an embodi-
ment of universal moral ideals or natural law, courts may find the uni-
versalist use of comparative sources most fruitful in discovering
transcendent principles that warrant local incorporation.
The spread of democracy and the advent of globalization have
led to a proliferation of dialogue within the transjudicial commu-
nity. 248 Anne-Marie Slaughter and Lawrence Heifer hail this develop-
ment of overlapping judicial networks through collective deliberation
as a positive step toward the promotion of a global rule of law. 249 Yet
in the United States, save in a few exceptional decisions, 250 the highest
courts have preferred to steer clear of this growing constitutional
trend and remain on the sidelines of this global phenomenon.
In this age of judicial globalization, it would be most timely for
the United States courts to recognize that a four-wall doctrine that
insulates American jurisprudence from foreign influences serves no
purpose today other than to preserve a misguided and unfounded
sense of historical legitimacy. As Justice Brandeis once taught, "If we
would guide by the light of reason, we must let our minds be bold."25 1
Perhaps it is time to raze these walls to the ground, once and for all.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 641.
248. See Claire L'Heureux-Dube, The Importance of Dialogue: Globalization and the Interna-
tional Impact of the Rehnquist Court, 34 TULSA LJ. 15 (1998).
249. Lawrence R. Heifer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Suprana-
tional Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 282 (1997).
250. See discussion supra Part IV.
251. Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504, 520 (1924).
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